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Mike Keirsbilck
The tongue, the mouth and safeguard of freedom:
Towards a governmental reading of Vondel’s Palamedes
(1625)
By the end of 1624, Vondel began to write Palamedes, a play that most critics
have taken to be an allegory on the execution of Johan vanOldenbarnevelt, grand
pensionary of the Dutch Republic, by Maurice, prince of Orange. Maurice and
Van Oldenbarnevelt led the Republic through some turbulent times. By the year
1617, however, their collaboration turned into a bitter struggle for power. When
Van Oldenbarnevelt undermined Maurice’s military authority by appointing
urban militias, Maurice had enough. In 1618, he made a coup and had Van
Oldenbarnevelt, together with some of his most prominent supporters, arrested
on grounds of treason. At his trial, which was in fact nothing more than a mock
trial, Van Oldenbarnevelt was sentenced to death. By his actions Maurice came
off best politically, but he lost his status with at least part of the people.1As we all
know, Vondel chose the side of Van Oldenbarnevelt and strongly rejected
Maurice’s actions. As a result, he started working on Palamedes in order to
ventilate his indignation. Due to the contemporary nature of the events it was, of
course, impossible to give chapter and verse. Therefore, the poet made use of
Virgil’s Aeneid and Ovid’s Metamorphoses with the tale of the wrongfully ac-
cused Palamedes.2
It is apparent that Vondel had political motives with his play. For the play’s
original audience it was abundantly clear that Palamedes, oft Vermoorde On-
nooselheyd actually dealt with the »murder« of the innocent Johan Van Old-
enbarnevelt. In times when the public opinion was shaped with pamphlets,
treatises and plays, Vondel really made a stand. At first sight, Vondel tried to win
the audience over to his view that Palamedes, or Van Oldenbarnevelt, was
1 For a comprehensive account of the events see Ben Knapen:DeMan en zijn Staat: Johan van
Oldenbarnevelt 1547–1610, Amsterdam 2008, pp. 287–331; Jan den Tex: Oldenbarnevelt,
Haarlem 1966, III, pp. 488–792; Jonathan I. Israel : The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness,
and Fall 1477–1806, Oxford 1998, pp. 433–439.
2 PubliusVirgiliusMaro :Aeneis, Amsterdam2008, Book II, 77–104. AndPubliusOvidius
Naso : Metamorphosen, Amsterdam 2009, Book XIII, 30–70, 307–312.
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wrongfully accused and died an unjust death.3 In the later criticism of the play,
this is still the general consensus. In 1879, Theodoor Jorissen also came to this
conclusion in his study on Palamedes en Gysbrecht van Aemstel.4 Later, W.A.P.
Smit in Van Pascha tot Noah (1956) stressed the influence of Seneca on Vondel’s
play, but he also concluded that it was an allegory camouflaged as an ancient
tragedy.5 In 1999, Lia van Gemert argued in Tussen de Bedrijven Door? that the
choruses all represent a political faction pro or contra Palamedes or Van Old-
enbarnevelt.6More recently in 2005, Klaus Beekman and Ralf Grüttemeier wrote
an article in which they show that Vondel portrayed Van Oldenbarnevelt as
Palamedes, which made him subject to censorship.7 In brief, nearly all critics of
the play focus on the Van Oldenbarnevelt allegory. Other analyses made by, for
example, Johan Gerritsen deal with textual criticism and the print history of the
play.8 Recently, there have been some studies that refrain from focusing pri-
marily on the allegory. In Fortuna, Fatum en Providentia Dei in de Nederlandse
Tragedie 1600–1720, Jan Konst supports the idea that Vondel resisted the notion
of the double predestination in favour of an ideology that builds upon the idea of
freedom of choice.9 Bettina Noak, in her article »Taal en Geweld in Enkele
Bijbelse Treurspelen van Joost van den Vondel«, argued that the language of
Agamemnon is that of a tyrant, a conclusion that she also ties to Vondel’s
reception of Maurice.10 In Vondel Belicht11 and the 2009 English adaptation
3 See for example Piet Calis : Vondel: Het Verhaal van zijn Leven, Amsterdam 2008, pp. 12–
14; Johannes Franciscus Maria Sterck, Het Leven van Joost van den Vondel, Haarlem
1926, p. 28; Piet Oomes : Joost van den Vondel, Leuven 1938, pp. 27–28; JohannesMelles :
Joost van den Vondel: een Geschiedenis van zijn Leven, Utrecht 1957, p. 43.
4 Theodoor Jorissen : Palamedes en Gysbreght van Aemstel: Kritische Studin, Amsterdam,
1879, pp. 1–56.
5 Wisse Alfred Pierre Smit: Van Pascha tot Noah, Zwolle 1956, pp. 100–125.
6 LiavanGemert : Tussen de Bedrijven door? De Functie van de Rei in Nederlandstalig Toneel
1556–1625, Deventer 1999, pp. 236–238.
7 Klaus Beeckman and Ralf Grüttemeier: Censuur en literatuur : Joost van den Vondels
Palamedes en Hendrik Smeeks’ Krinke Kesmes, in: ibid., De Wet van de Letter, Am-
sterdam 2005, pp. 11–27.
8 JohanGerritsen:De eerste druk van de Palamedes, in: Henry F. Hofman andKoert van
der Hof (eds.), Uit Bibliotheektuin en Informatieveld: Opstellen aangeboden aan Dr. D.
Grosheide bij zijn afscheid als bibliothecaris van de Rijksuniversiteit te Utrecht, Utrecht 1978,
pp. 219–230.
9 Jan Konst: Fortuna, Fatum en Providentia Dei in de Nederlandse Tragedie 1600–1720,
Hilversum 2003, pp. 178–184.
10 Bettina Noak : Taal en Geweld in Enkele Bijbelse Treurspelen van Joost van den Vondel, in:
Neerlandistiek.NL, 2007. (online: http://www.neerlandistiek.nl/publish/articles/000155/ar-
ticle.pdf; accessed September 09, 2013)
11 Frans-Willem Korsten : Vondel Belicht: Voorstellingen van Soevereiniteit, Hilversum
2006, pp. 129–137.
Mike Keirsbilck276
12
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
Sovereignty as Inviolability,12 Frans-Willem Korsten points out that the pre-
destination of the events is put into question. He argues the text poses a fun-
damental question: how can God be responsible for the death of innocent
people? If it is possible that people are responsible, Christian history cannot be
reduced to one efficient process. Therefore, Korsten suggests, Christian history
in the play is shown to be an inconsistent, inefficient process that Vondel wanted
to revise. Finally, Nina Geerdink contributed to the recently published bundle
Joost van den Vondel (1587–1679) an article with the significant title »Politics
and Aesthetics – Decoding Allegory in Palamedes«.13 Geerdink touches on the
fact that the allegory has a complex function that goes beyond a »thinly veiled
political statement«,14 and shows in her article that »allegory is both more than
rhetoric or a literary game and more than a thin veil to cover a political state-
ment«.15 She concludes that the interaction between both politics and aesthetics
is pivotal to Palamedes.16
Yet, all of the above studies have in common that they take the allegory more
or less at face value: according to each of these scholars, the play can be read as a
reflection on the tragic demise of Van Oldenbarnevelt. Every character in the
play can be tied to and identified with a historical figure. As a result, we can read
Palamedes as a critique of the groundless execution of Van Oldenbarnevelt.
When we try to contextualize the play in its historical reality, the allegory does
indeed immediately catch the eye. Yet, if we read the text more closely we can
discover that underneath this allegory another level of interpretation is possible.
The play is not only a critique of the groundless execution of Van Old-
enbarnevelt, but also a critique of the order of the contemporary state. By
making use of Michel Foucault’s notion of »governmentality«, I will try to
sidestep the play’s allegory and try to show that at the heart of it we can also read
the fear that the tolerant and flourishing state would fall into abuse and injustice,
not only because Van Oldenbarnevelt was sentenced to death, but because the
regime that camewithMaurice could be harmful for the development of the state
and its economy. As such, the play seems to present a clash between an old policy
and new forms of government. Seen in this way, the text can be read as an agent in
the contemporary debate on the order of the state.
12 Frans-Willem Korsten: Sovereignty as Inviolability : Vondel’s Theatrical Explorations in
the Dutch Republic, Hilversum 2009, pp.119–131.
13 Nina Geerdink : Politics and Aesthetics – Decoding Allegory in Palamedes, in: Frans-
Willem Korsten and Jan Bloemendal : Joost van den Vondel (1587–1679) Dutch
Playwright in the Golden Age, Leiden 2012, pp. 225–248.
14 Geerdink (see n. 13), p. 225.
15 Geerdink (see n. 13), p. 248.
16 Geerdink (see n. 13), ibid.
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1 Foucault’s governmentality
During his course Security, Territory, Population (1977–78) at the Collge de
France, Foucault famously elaborates on his notion of »governmentality«. He
makes a genealogical studyon the evolution of government and notices that from
the 16th century onwards, various older and newer mechanisms of the man-
agement of the population are being implemented. The first of thesemechanisms
is, according to Foucault, the juridico-legal mechanism. This mechanism is the
archaic form of penal order, a mechanism that inWestern Europe runs from the
Middle Ages until the 17th and even 18th century.17 The second mechanism
Foucault describes is the disciplinary mechanism, which begins to rise from the
17th century onwards. Foucault explains the difference between the two systems
as follows:
[T]he first form, which consists in laying down a law and fixing a punishment for the
person who breaks it, which is the system of the legal code with a binary division
between the permitted and the prohibited, and a coupling, comprising the code, be-
tween a type of prohibited action and a type of punishment. This, then, is the legal or
juridical mechanism. […] [T]he law framed by mechanisms of surveillance and cor-
rection, […] is […] the disciplinary mechanism. The disciplinary mechanism is
characterized by the fact that a third personage, the culprit, appears within the binary
system of the code, and at the same time, outside the code, and outside the legislative
act that establishes the law and the judicial act that punishes the culprit, a series of
adjacent, detective, medical, and psychological techniques appear which fall within the
domain of surveillance, diagnosis, and the possible transformation of individuals.18
The difference between these two forms of government is to be understood
within the context of the idea of the maximization of the state. According to
Foucault, this concept emerged in the 17th century, together with the awareness
that processes and people needed to be managed in such a way that the best and
most productive result was reached. A person who was hung could set an ex-
ample for the rest of the people. This way, the people were encouraged by the
head of state to follow the policy. Because of their own benefit, they would act in
the best interest of the state. The practices of public torture and execution can be
seen as a corrective and disciplinary technique. While they may have an eco-
nomic aim, they are clearly still rooted in the juridico-legal and disciplinary
domain.19 When a person committed an offence, he became an offender and
17 Michel Foucault : Security, Territory, Population, Arnold I. Davidson (ed.), Ne-
w York 2009, p. 6.
18 Foucault (see n. 17), p. 5.
19 Foucault described these practices more at length in his famous workDiscipline and Punish:
The Birth of the Prison. For an account of the disciplinary and juridico-legal mechanisms see
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needed to be corrected.20 What was catalogued as an offence was strictly regu-
lated. To Foucault, these mechanisms tie in with the politics of sovereignty :
what enabled sovereignty to achieve its aim of obedience to the laws, was the law itself ;
law and sovereignty were absolutely united.21
All of this changedwith the rise of the thirdmechanism Foucault describes.With
the mechanism of security, which starts from the 18th century onwards, all too
strict criteria are abandoned:22
[I]nstead of a binary division between the permitted and the prohibited, one estab-
lishes an average considered as optimal on the one hand, and, on the other, a bandwidth
of the acceptable that must not be exceeded. In this way a completely different dis-
tribution of things and mechanisms takes shape.23
Within this mechanism processes are more able to just happen, which can be
linked to the laisser-faire, passer et allerdoctrine of liberalism.24The reality of the
natural processes had shown that too strict regulations could turn out counter-
productive.25Acertain amount of freedomwas inserted in the governance, which
proved necessary for the enhancement of the productivity of the state.26 The
insertion of freedom in the governance had very profound repercussions for the
way people were governed:
[T]he population no longer appears as a collection of subjects of right, as a collection of
subject wills who must obey the sovereign’s will through the intermediary of regu-
lations, laws, edicts and so on. It will be considered as a set of processes to be managed
at the level and on the basis of what is natural in these processes.27
Michel Foucault :Discipline, Toezicht en Straf: De Geboorte van de Gevangenis, Groningen
2007, pp. 10–99.
20 Foucault (see n. 17), p. 7.
21 Foucault (see n. 17), p. 100.
22 Even though Foucault sees the system of security becoming installed in the 18th century, he
does mention that this shift in governing started in the 17th century with the economical
doctrines of mercantilism and cameralism: Foucault (see n. 17), p. 68.
23 Foucault (see n.17), p. 6.
24 Foucault (see n. 17), pp. 46–49.
25 Foucault gives the example of the regulations on grain in times of scarcity. Price control and
the prohibition to export grain were intended to counter scarcity and high prices on the
market. Yet, this seemed to be counter-productive as this systemprovided very little profit for
the peasant. The less profit, the less the peasant will be able to sow for the next year, thus
resulting in scarcity : Foucault (see n.17), pp. 32–33.
26 When you let things naturally take its course it will entail its own self-curbing and self-
regulating: Foucault (see n. 17), p. 42.
27 Foucault (see n. 17), p. 70.
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As opposed to the other mechanisms that correlate with sovereignty, Foucault
sees this mechanism of security link in with what he calls »governmentality«.
Compared with sovereignty :
[I]t is not a matter of imposing a law onmen, but of the disposition of things, that is to
say, of employing tactics rather than laws, or, of as far as possible employing laws as
tactics; arranging things so that this or that end may be achieved through a certain
number of means.28
These changes can be distinguished from each other, but it’s impossible to pin
themdown to a specific point in time. These are different techniques that emerge
over time and gradually become more significant. That doesn’t mean that one
system will replace another one:
In reality you have a series of complex edifices in which, of course, the techniques
themselves change and are perfected, or anyway become more complicated, but in
which above all changes is the dominant characteristic, or more exactly, the system of
correlation between juridico-legal mechanisms, disciplinary mechanisms and mech-
anisms of security.29
In his genealogical research of these systems Foucault does, however, notice a
rupture in the 16th century when the dominance of sovereignty starts to decline.
In the 16th century the world-view has thoroughly changed. Because of this, the
prince or sovereign could no longer straightforwardly appeal to old principles to
rule over his territory.30 In the middle of the 16th century the art of governing
emerges. An important difference here is that there is both an upward and a
downward continuity in this form of governing:
There is upward continuity in the sense that whoever wants to be able to govern the
state must first know how to govern himself, and then, on another level, his family, his
goods, his lands, after which he will succeed in governing the state. […] Then there is
continuity in the opposite, downward direction in the sense that when a state is gov-
ernedwell, fathers will know how to govern their families, their wealth, their goods, and
their property as well, and individuals will also conduct themselves properly.31
This is a crucial shift, because the question of governance became a private
problem: how can one govern oneself, one’s children, and one’s family? Or how
do I relate myself to others, the authorities or sovereign? From the 16th century
onwards people actively pursued better forms of governance.32
28 Foucault (see n. 17), p. 100.
29 Foucault (see n. 17), p. 8.
30 Foucault (see n. 17), pp. 73; 88–89.
31 Foucault (see n. 17), p. 94.
32 Foucault (see n. 17), p. 88.
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The art of governing becomes settled, repressing sovereign thoughts. A po-
litical economy is at the core of this new way of thinking. As Foucault puts it :
Whereas the end of sovereignty is internal to itself and gets its instruments from itself in
the form of law, the end of government is internal to the things it directs; it is to be
sought in the perfection, maximization, or intensification of the processes it directs,
and the instruments of government will become diverse tactics rather than law.33
As a result the ruler can now be seen as some sort of manager. His duty is to
manage the state and the people in such a manner that both can develop. The
Dutch Republic was the centre of the world trade, and had to perfect and
maximize itself to compete with other states. By consequence the state had to
rethink its managing techniques. Instead of clinging to the word of the law, they
had to reorganize the way processes were conducted. This shift has another
repercussion: the ruler must be competent. Being appointed by God, or being
virtuous as opposed to earlier times is not good enough anymore.34 Society
moved over to a meritocracy where the people in charge should be the most
capable.35 Of course, nepotism is of all times. Yet there seems to have been an
awareness of and a demand for capable and good governance, which can be tied
to this shift in conduct. This good governance aspires awell-ordered state, where
autonomy and tasks are carefully considered and distributed. Foucault states
that the oldway of government with regulatory control breaks down to some sort
of double system:
On the one handwill be awhole series ofmechanisms that fall within the province of the
economy and the management of the population with the function of increasing the
forces of the state. Then, on the other hand, there will be an apparatus of instruments
for ensuring the prevention or repression of disorder, irregularity, illegality, and de-
linquencies.36
Despite this rupture it is important to note that Foucault doesn’t see these
differences as final, nor do they appear brusque. When Foucault opposes sov-
ereignty to governmentality he doesn’t do this in order to simply contend that
the former gets replaced by the latter. Both political systems remain active at the
same time. As with the juridico-legalmechanisms, disciplinary mechanisms and
33 Foucault (see n. 17), p. 99.
34 See for example: Ernst H. Kantorowicz : The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval
Political Theology, Princeton 1997 [1957], pp. 8–9.
35 Apossible explanation for these explicit references tomeritocracy in treatises andpamphlets
could be the influence of the Republic of Venice, which was set as an example for good
governance by a number of prominent authors. It was believed that in Venice each year
citizens’ merits were scrutinized. If it turned out to be positive, the citizen could become a
member of the ruling council. See for example: Peter Burke : Veneti en Amsterdam: een
Onderzoek naar Elites in de Zeventiende Eeuw, Amsterdam 1991, p. 48.
36 Foucault (see n. 17), p. 353.
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mechanisms of security there can be a shift in dominance. Even though at the
base of both systems lies a completely different conception of power, it does not
imply that the sovereign system gets abolished altogether. To Foucault, a sov-
ereign rules a territory, without taking care of the subjects. Opposed to that,
governmentality will subjectify because it addresses individuals to take up an
active role within the government.37 If they are governed well, they will be able to
govern their own families and goods, and they will also conduct themselves
properly. Whenwe look at the massive pile of treatises and books about political
theory in the 16th and 17th century this seems to be right. According to Foucault, a
great many authors were actively thinking about how to govern oneself and how
to be governed best. We can see numerous examples whose influence on the Low
Countries has been sufficiently stressed: Machiavelli, Guicciardini, Bodin, De
Groot, Spinoza, Hobbes, The De la Court brothers, … In what follows, I would
like to read Vondel’s play as one of those »governmental« reflections.
2 Palamedes: analysis
For the analysis of the play I will take both the reception of the play in 1625 and
the text itself into account. Both can be profitably linked to Foucault’s gov-
ernmentality and thus provide a better understanding of the subtext of Pala-
medes, with regards to the politics of governance.38
2.1 Reception
Before I get to the actual play I will briefly look at the reception of the play,
because I believe it can give us some interesting insights in the way the state
functioned, with regards to Foucault’s framework.
As stated in the introduction, Palamedes was meant to be an allegory on the
execution of Van Oldenbarnevelt by Maurice. Vondel sided with Van Old-
enbarnevelt and wanted to depict the injustice of this political »murder«. Be-
cause Maurice was still installed as the ruler over the Republic, Vondel had to be
careful not to be accused of lese-majesty. By the time the playwas almost finished
Maurice had been taken ill. Geeraardt Brandt, biographer of Vondel, tells us that
37 According to Foucault, the backbone of this individualization is the Christian pastorate. The
government of souls was a central and learned activity indispensible for the salvation of all
and of each. Foucault (see n. 17), p. 471.
38 This article presents a first analysis of the play. Within the scope of my PhD project I will be
analysing the play more in depth. For more information on the project see: http://
www.gems.ugent.be/research (accessed September 09, 2013).
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Vondel, when hearing the news of the dying Maurice, called out: »Laat hem
sterven. Ik belui hem vast.«39 Maurice did die at the beginning of 1625 and was
succeeded by his half-brother Frederick Henry. The new stadtholder opted for a
more pragmatic course and the climate in the Republic became more calm and
tolerant.40 This must have given Vondel the confidence to publish Palamedes
later that year under his own name. The decision proved to be a bit presump-
tuous, because it didn’t take very long before there was a demand for re-
percussions. The Counter-Remonstrant authorities, which had pledged alle-
giance to Maurice, were outraged and protested to have the author handed over
to the States of Holland in The Hague. The authorities in Amsterdam, however,
did not really feel like doing that. This faction feltmore sympathetic towardsVan
Oldenbarnevelt and was heading for a more tolerant attitude. The authorities of
Amsterdam decided not to hand the poet over, but rather try Vondel themselves.
Because of his defence that the play had to be read as ancient tragedy – all other
readingswere solely ascribed to the reader himself – the judges did not arrive at a
unanimous verdict. Vondel got away with it and only had to pay a fine and have
the publication burnt. The fine was paid by others, and in the tradition of
Amsterdam, the books never got burnt. Despite all the commotion Vondel
walked away unharmed.41
This short history holds a number of interesting suggestions. First, it shows
that the juridico-political authority in the Republic was indeed distributed: on
the one hand there is a level onwhich the economy and management of the state
is situated. On the other hand, as Foucault explains, there is amore confined level
that has jurisdiction over the prevention or repression of disorder, irregularity,
illegality and delinquencies.42 The States of Hollandmay be seated at The Hague,
they don’t, however, have full authority over the Republic. Amsterdam had the
power to decline The Hague’s request and try Vondel herself. We must take note
that it was formally not insubordinate behaviour. Vondel was indeed tried.
Amsterdam was perfectly authorized to do this herself, so the town’s judges
could reject the request to extradition.
Secondly, with the rejection of Amsterdam we can see a return to tolerance.
Under the reign of Van Oldenbarnevelt, the Republic maintained a pragmatic
tolerant course. After his death, under the influence of the Counter-Re-
39 Geeraardt Brandt : Het leven van Joost Van Den Vondel, P. Leendertz jr. (ed.), ’s Gra-
venshage 1932, p. 15 »Let him die, I’ll already toll his bell.«
40 On the more calm climate in the Republic after Maurice, see for example Henk Nellen :
Hugo deGroot: Een Leven in Strijd omdeVrede, Amsterdam2007, pp. 317–323, 360–363. Or
Israel (see n. 1), pp. 485–499.
41 For a more detailed account of this episode see Calis (see n. 3), pp. 11–27; Knapen
(see n. 1), pp. 336–337; Oomes (see n. 3), p. 30; Melles (see n. 3), p. 43.
42 Foucault (see n. 17), p. 353.
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monstrants, society became more rigorous. Now with the passing of Maurice
therewas a restoration of tolerance.43Of course, the freedomand tolerance in the
Republic was relative. Authors could not write or say whatever they wanted, the
trial of Vondel made that clear. Yet to a certain degree, there was a predilection
towards liberty.
As Foucault would argue, the power could be seen to break down in a double
system. The States of Holland were in charge of the economy and the manage-
ment of both state and population. The trial of Vondel was not their concern.
This was the responsibility of Amsterdam. It was her task to repress and prevent
disorder and illegality within the city’s bounds. The Amsterdam judges could
not agree on the illegality of Vondel’s text, but they couldn’t let him go without
any form of penalty. This would have stirred things up with the Counter-Re-
monstrants. In order to prevent disorder they sanctioned Vondel mildly.
The immediate context in which Palamedes originated shows us that the
Republic indeed was directed towards a well-ordered state with distributed
power. The fact that Amsterdam refused to obey The Hague, although perfectly
legal, does make a statement. It indicates that the order and the realization of the
state were subject to discussion. In what follows I will try to show that consid-
erations about the order of the state and the distribution of power are also
present in Vondel’s text.
2.2 Text
The text tells the story of the demise of Palamedes, the son of the Euboean king.
This heir to the throne of the Greek island addresses us in the first act, and lets us
know that he is subject to slander. He has been accused of some terrible things,
but he is completely innocent. In the second act, we meet Ulysses, supporter of
Agamemnon, who conspires against Palamedes: they will bury gold at the place
where his tent was. A letter will be sent in which it is stated that he received the
gold from the enemy, which would make him a traitor. The plan is completed in
the third act. The letter reaches Agamemnon who immediately takes it at face
value. Nestor and Ajax have doubts about the authenticity of the letter, which
leads to a discussion. To resolve this discussion, Ulysses cunningly suggests that
they search for the gold. If Palamedes is innocent the gold will not be there. If he
is guilty they will find it. We also find out that Calches, the priest, bears a grudge
against Palamedes because he wanted to restrain the power of the clergy. He too
wants Palamedes dead, and will give Agamemnon his support. At the end of the
act, Palamedes is court-martialled. Palamedes’s enemies and adversaries make
43 Israel (see n. 1), p. 488–490.
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up the tribunal that will judge him. Oates, Palamedes’s younger brother, insists
with Agamemnon at the beginning of the fourth act that Nestor be included
among the members of court. Only with Nestor present a just verdict will be
possible. But Nestor’s influence is insufficient: Palamedes will be sentenced to
death. We get an exposØ about his death at the beginning of act five by a mes-
senger.
In the following analysis I want to read the text in terms of a conflict between
two different types of policy. On the one hand, there is the sort of policy Aga-
memnon stands for : a sovereign policy with absolute and centralized power that
uses disciplinary techniques tomake his people fall into step. On the other hand,
there is Palamedes’s approach: a ›governmental‹ policy with awell-ordered state
that distributes authority, preserves privileges and liberties. At the same time it
makes even use of mechanisms of security. In this play we can perceive three
specific ways of orders: policy, religion and justice. I will discuss these three
separately.
2.2.1 Policy
Let us start with a clarification of the order of policy within the scope of gov-
ernment. In act three, during the discussion with Nestor, it becomes clear that
Agamemnon stands for a policy where he alone has all the power. His word is the
law, and all have to obey. Related to Foucault’s framework, this policy can be
characterized as a sovereign one:44
Agamemnon:
Wat Agamemnon drijft dat moet voor al geschien.
‹Tbetaemt den minderen voor meerdre macht te duycken.
Nestor :
Een koning kan seer licht d’ontfange macht misbruycken.
Agamemnnon:
Dat oordeel staet aen hem.
Nestor :
En oock aen syn gemeent,
Van wie hy syne macht, en heerlyckheyt ontleent.
De koning is om ’t volck. Wijs die sich weet te voegen.45
44 Joost Van den Vondel : Palamedes oft Vermoorde Onnooselheyd, in: De Werken van
Vondel, J.F.M. Sterck (ed.), Amsterdam 1928, p. 683.
45 Agamemnon:
What Agamemnon desires above all must happen.
It is becoming that the lesser should bow for higher power.
Nestor :
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Agamemnon, who as a character represents Maurice, expects absolute power.
Nestor, the voice of the impartial judges, immediately sees the danger, inherent
in such a model, of the abuse of power. To him, the prince receives his authority
from the people. It’s his duty to take the people’s wishes into account. This is
reminiscent of what Foucault understood to be the art of governing: when a ruler
looks after its people, the people will behave. The rupture between the notions of
policy is sharply spelled out in this fragment. Using Foucault’s vocabulary, two
conflicting groups can be distinguished. On the one hand, there is Palamedes
and his supporters with the governmental policy, on the other hand there is
Agamemnon and his supporters with the sovereign policy. Ulysses, for example,
as an ally of Agamemnon advocates a sovereign absolute power, when he ex-
plains in act two why he wants to incriminate Palamedes:46
De wereld geensins lyd twee schitterende sonnen:
Soo duld geene heerschappy twee hoofden in een rijck:
Geen vorst, syne wederga: geen koning syns gelyck.
D’Euber [Palamedes] is te hoogh in mogentheyd gestegen,
En aensien by ’t gemeen: dit’s Agamemnon tegen.47
According to him it is impossible for a state to have two leaders. The authority
must be absolute. It’s not possible that kingship, a divine appointment, gets
mixed with worldly matters. Such an idea is a violation of the king’s ascendancy,
and therefore Agamemnon has the right to take revenge. By 1625 this seemed to
be an outdated opinion. The people demanded a capable government. To occupy
a position one should not only be worthy but competent as well. Agamemnon
betrays the regional princes with his sovereign ambitions; therefore he’s not
competent to be king. The night before his execution Palamedes will explain to
us what’s to be expected from a prince:48
’T is waer Ick duld ‹et noyt, noch sal het niet gehengen
Met myn’ bestemming, datme’ onordenlyck ga mengen
A king can easily abuse the power received.
Agamemnon:
He is the judge of that.
Nestor :
Also his people,
From whom he borrows his power and authority.
The king is of the people. He that knows how to behave is a wise man.
46 Van den Vondel (see n. 44), p. 661.
47 The world certainly doesn’t tolerate two shining suns:
As no sovereignty tolerates two heads of a state:
No prince, his complement: no king his equal.
The Euboean [Palamedes] has risen too high in power
And regard with the people: this disagrees with Agamemnon.
48 Van den Vondel (see n. 44), p. 692.
Mike Keirsbilck286
12
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
’T bysonder en ’t gemeen, ‹twelck groot geschil verweckt.
Het opperste gesagh, als hy ten velde treckt,
Is met gemeenen raed syn scepter opgdragen:
Niet om ’t bysonder recht der vorsten te belagen,
En dese maght so wyd te strecken, datter een
’T bysonder eygendom sou smelten in ’t gemeen.
En als een dwingeland sich in den setel setten,
En schenden de van ouds besworen Griecxsche wetten
Hoe kan ick schaemteloos dat onrecht met hem staen,
En tegens eer en eed myn vaderland verraen?49
It could not be expected of him to allow the well-ordered Republic to be at risk. It
couldn’t be allowed that a sovereign would reign over the Republic (the com-
mon). The regions had their own autonomy (the particular). Agamemnon did
have the authority over military matters, but that didn’t give him the right to
claim the sovereign throne. It contradicts the laws of the Republic. If Palamedes
had allowed this, then he would have been guilty of high treason.
The conflict between the two kinds of policy can be analysed, using Foucault’s
framework, as sovereignty opposed to governmentality. Sovereignty, with Aga-
memnon, is depicted almost as a form of tyranny. His word is the law and he
expects total obedience. Even his followers would not allow the authority and
power to be shared. The state only needs one supreme ruler, who shouldn’t allow
any interference from second or third parties. Opposed to that, a more gov-
ernmental approach can be found with Nestor and Palamedes. Nestor, as the
symbol of wisdom, contradicts Agamemnon and stresses that he received the
power from his people. Therefore he is obliged to listen to his people and not to
make abuse of his power. Palamedes, fromhis side, could not allow the state to be
managed by one supreme ruler. Power is entrusted by the people, and not for the
rulers to take. Moreover, the state is ordered in such a way that autonomous
regions hold their own authority. If he allowed Agamemnon to claim absolute
power, the order of the state would have been violated. For Palamedes, the
regulatory control of the government broke down into a double system. On the
49 It is true I won’t allow it, nor will I let it happen
That with my consent they will disorderly coalesce
The particular and the common, which arouses severe disputes.
When the highest power goes to war
His sceptre is entrusted to him by common consent:
Not to violate the particular rights of the princes
Nor to stretch his powers to the limits where
Particular attributes are lost in the common.
And when a tyrant claims the throne,
And disregards the ancient Greek laws
How can I shamelessly choose his unjust side,
Thus betraying my virtue and my oath to my fatherland?
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one hand, there is the state that is in charge for the general management, and on
the other hand there are the autonomous regions that hold their own authority.
To him it is very important these autonomous regions remain autonomous and
don’t dissolve into the state’s absolute power. This can be tied up with Foucault’s
governmentality as well. When the state has total control, or regulates every
process, this can prove harmful to the development of the state. This view on
policy is very different from the sovereign policy that can be found with Aga-
memnon. At the core lies a divergent concept of how to execute power. To both
parties, these differences seem to be irreconcilable, which leads up to this
conflict between these two men of state.
2.2.2 Religion
The conflict that is depicted between the two men of state goes beyond different
visions of policy. Because of the support of the religious faction, the status of
religion in the state’s policy is bound to change, even thoughmost people do not
perceive this. Palamedes explains to us during his speech the night before his
execution:50
De meesten hoop is blind, om d’oorsaeck van dit wrocken
Te sien met onderscheyd: oock heeftmer in betrocken
’t Verschil van kerckenplicht, de macht van ’t geestlijck hof,
En ’t geen den dienst betreft der Goden: dese stof
Soodanigh is van aerd, dat allerley krackelen,
Dat sucht tot eyge baet, en staet hier onder spelen:
En alle schelmery, die slechts een schijngestalt
Van hayligheyd ontleent, licht door dien trechter valt.
Men hitst volcx harten op tot dolligheyd door ’t kryten,
En d’alderstercxte past den swackxten uyt te byten.51
In this fragment not only the people’s blindness is criticized, but the im-
plications of involving religiousmatters in state-policy is also dreaded.Whenwe
project this fragment on the situation in the Republic we can understand the
50 Van den Vondel (see n. 44), p. 662.
51 Most of them are blind to see with proper judgment
The origin of this vengeance: they also involved
The difference in church duty, the power of the clerical court,
And as for the service to the Gods: this matter
Is of such a nature, that all kinds of quarrels
Only benefit self-interest and supremacy :
And this entire devilry, that’s only holy
In appearance, by result is easily exposed.
With their cheers they instigate people’s fury
And the strongest eat the weakest.
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subtext of anxiety. If the Counter-Remonstrants get their way the clerical court
would claim power. This contradicts the policy of Van Oldenbarnevelt that gave
the regions the authority to decide in religious matters. The Counter-Re-
monstrants disputed this and wanted a policy in which religion would have
supremacy over worldly matters. When we focus back on the text we can see
Palamedes dealt with similar issues. In his appeal he explains why he would not
allow interference by the clerical court:52
Soo dryf ick dan niet nieus, of selsaems, soomen ’t noemt:
Maer ’t priesterdom, dat slincx het wereldlyck verdoemt.
Genomen ick waer stom, en liet den teugel slippen,
Tot wroeging myner siele, en schennis myner lippen:
Sou niet te duchten staen gewetens scharpe dwang,
Waer aen gekoppelt is der steden ondergang?53
It is not because of his refusal to give the church authority that he started
discord. It is the priests that stir things up. If he had allowed it to happen it would
have been a violation of his oath of only acting in the best interest of the state. He
fears the moral restraint that will accompany this policy, which inevitably would
lead to the city’s demise. If the rigid Calvinists indeed would have their way it
would put an end to liberty and tolerance. A flourishing state simply needs to
have this freedom if it wants to develop. This way we could say Palamedes is
turned into an icon of this freedom. After Palamedes has been arrested, Oates
will cry out, at the beginning of act four:54
Men gaet hem na, en stelt syn’ vyand tot syn’ rechter.
Hy die de tong, de mond, en het schild der vryheid is;
Syn vrydom nu ontbeert, in sware vangenis.
Hoe kan Ulysses doch een wettigh vonnis spreecken?55
Another appeal to keep the authority to the autonomous regions can be read
here. This time, it is the priests who want to claim power. This too is something
Palamedes can’t allow. The moral restraint, rules and regulations that rigid
52 Van den Vondel (see n. 44), p. 690.
53 I don’t use force to establish innovations, or rarities, like they call it:
But the clergy do, who misleadingly call the secular authority impious.
If I were to remain silent, and slackened the reins,
It would lead to my soul weighed down, and violation of my oath:
Wouldn’t it inevitably lead to severe moral restraint
Accompanied by the demise of the cities?
54 Van den Vondel (see n. 44), p. 708.
55 They put him under scrutiny, and appoint his enemy as his judge.
He who is the tongue, the mouth and safeguard of freedom;
Now lacks freedom, in solitary imprisonment.
How can Ulysses ever sentence him legally?
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priests like Calches would like to have installed, would surely lead to the loss of
freedom. As Foucault argued, over-regulating the society proves to be counter-
productive. This seems to be something Palamedes dreaded. The policy the
priests strove for, according to Palamedes, would lead to the cities’ demise.
Godly sovereignty, where the word of God is the law, conflicts with the more
governmental approach Palamedes wanted to implement. As was the case with
Agamemnon, absolute power is out of the question. The regions must remain
autonomous and have the authority over religious matters. Having the hands
tied by the priests could be catastrophic for the development of the state. A
certain amount of freedom, to come back to Foucault’s governmentality, has to
be inserted in the policy to safeguard the state’s wellbeing. A very different
conception of policy lies at the core of this conflict. For the priests the wellbeing
and salvation of the state is dependent on the word of God. To Palamedes this
conception is counter-productive. He opposes the priests’ policy, with the moral
restraint and regulations that would comewith it. As a result, Oates portrays him
as themouth and safeguard of freedomand therefore, froma governmental point
of view, the safeguard of the state’s wellbeing.
2.2.3 Justice
The question Oates poses, »How can Ulysses ever sentence him legally?«, brings
us to our final point: justice. Early on in the play it becomes clear that the text is
concerned with how justice is implemented. The old system with revenge and
blood feuds is outdated. Instead a fair and legal judiciary should be im-
plemented. The discussion between Nestor and Agamemnon provides a good
example. Nestor stresses that revenge is not right. Instead they should apply
reason and don’t jump to conclusions. To him, what Foucault called the juridico-
legal and disciplinary mechanisms fall short. Applying the law at any cost and
correcting the dissidents with corporal punishment, or even death, is no true
justice. Contrary to Agamemnon he pleads for a moderate approach towards
judgement. Correlating this to Foucault’s governmentality, Nestor seems to be
more sympathetic towards mechanisms of security :56
Houd ghemack ghy heeren. Laet de schael
Van ware billickheyd beslechten d’ongelijcken.
Hoe kan u hevigh sweerd een wettigh vonnis strijcken.
Die ’t recht heeft op syn’ sy’ vaeck sneuvelt door het spits.
Besadight breyn u schey’; die rechter is te bits.57
56 Van den Vondel (see n. 44), p. 678.
57 Remain calm gentlemen. Let the scale of
True judiciousness settle this inequity.
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Implementing justice by sword is a mockery. It can hardly be considered lawful.
Only the reasonable mind can pass judgement lawfully. But Nestor also more
explicitly advances towards themechanisms of security. Not everything needs to
be punished at all costs. A state that acts fair and moderate should not want to
persecute every supposed offender. In the discussion between Nestor and
Agamemnon it becomes apparent that the latter still reasons within the Fou-
cauldian disciplinary techniques. The ideas Nestor proposes seem to lack de-
cisiveness to him:58
Agamemnon:
Ghy vreest niet eens den staet door slapheyt te verkorten.
Nestor :
De rechter handelt wijs, die veel quaeddoenders spaert
Om eene onnoosle ziel te vryen van het swaerd.
Agamemnon:
Soo kan geen ryck bestaen.
Nestor :
So kan het eewigh duuren,
Gerechtigheyd die bout de koninglycke muuren:
Daer onrecht en geweld palaysen ommeruckt59
If Agamemnon convicts Palamedes he can set an example and may bring other
dissidents to their senses. Nestor makes use of a different logic. Analogous with
Foucault’s he proposes mechanisms of security. It is important that a state
implements a certain tolerance, a certain laisser-aller. An empire that only re-
sorts to bloodshed will inevitably regress to revenge and retaliation. Only
moderation and a certain tolerance canmaintain a state. Nestor strongly believes
that it’s even better to let a supposed offender walk free, if that can save one
innocent life. Agamemnon cannot comprehend this. A state cannot possibly
How can your vengeful sword pass a lawful sentence.
He who has justice on his side often dies by the sword.
Mild reason should decide; not that sharp blade.
58 Van den Vondel (see n. 44), pp. 679–680.
59 Agamemnon:
You’re not even afraid to hurt the state by weakness.
Nestor :
A judge acts wisely, when he spares many wrongdoers
To save one innocent soul from the sword.
Agamemnon:
That way no empire can exist.
Nestor :
That way it can last forever.
Justice builds the royal walls:
While inequity and violence make palaces fall.
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survive like that, but Nestor makes clear that his way is the only way in which a
state can last forever. So at the core of justice, a divergent point of view can be
found aswell. The juridico-legal and disciplinary mechanismsAgamemnonputs
into action disagree with the mechanisms of security Nestor advocates. When
reading the text the reader cannot help but feel sympathetic towards Nestor’s
point of view. Agamemnon’s way might have worked in earlier times, it is found
lacking in the contemporary society.
3 Conclusion
I have tried to show that we can read more into Palamedes than the allegory on
Maurits and Van Oldenbarnevelt. Politics and policy about how to organize and
order the state was subject of public debate in the 17th century.Whenwe read the
text in light of Foucault’s notion of governmentality, it seems that we are able to
grasp more of that contemporary debate. Underneath the surface of the allegory
of the execution of the grand pensionary we can also read amuch broader debate
on how to organize the society. Van Oldenbarnevelt andMaurice established the
Republic as sovereign state, relieved from Spanish supremacy. Van Old-
enbarnevelt was constantly aiming for a better order of the state in order to
reinforce and consolidate the position of the Republic. After his death Vondel,
together with the supporters of Van Oldenbarnevelt, feared that the carefully
built state would decline if they would allow a centralized absolutistic and godly
sovereign power. Therewas this concern that tolerance, reason and justice would
be out of the question. The sovereign juridico-legal and disciplinary techniques
fell short to order the contemporary state. To cultivate the growth and the
wellbeing of the state a different approach proved to be necessary. A form of
government with distributed authority, that doesn’t only respect liberty and
tolerance but also implements it its operation. In short: a form of government we
can call governmentality. These ideas circulated in the 17th century, as a lot of
prominent members of society took part in that debate. Think for example of
Hugo de Groot and Baruch Spinoza.60
This analysis, by consequence, also poses the question if we could consider
Maurice as sovereign and Van Oldenbarnevelt as governmental. Of course, this
question is not easily answered. Firstly, Foucault argued that governmentality
and sovereignty are not mutually exclusive. Both can be active at the same time.
So cataloguing Maurice as a clear-cut sovereign and Van Oldenbarnevelt as a
60 For Hugo de Groot, see for example De Republica Emendanda (1601), or Parallelon Re-
rumpublicarum (1602). For Baruch Spinoza, see for example Tractatus Theologico-Politicus,
which was eventually published in 1670, albeit anonymously.
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straightforward governmental would not be that fruitful. There would be plenty
of counterarguments to be found for both. Secondly, when we read texts like
Palamedes, it is important to keep in mind these depictions of the men of state
are coloured. Instead of pinning a historical figure down to one point of view on
the basis of texts, it seems tomemore interesting to look at the dialogue between
ideas about the order of the state that are included in those texts, and how these
relate to the public political debate. Using Foucault’s framework, I have tried to
detect some of these ideas regarding the order of the state in Palamedes. I have
analysed this in relation to policy as well as to religion and justice. By making use
of the notion of governmentality, I hope to have shown that we can come to a
different reading of the play.61
61 I would like to thank Marrigje Paijmans for her attentive proofreading of this article. Her
suggestions made this text more accurate and comprehensible.
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